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Abstract 
 
Security compliance has now become a major information systems management problem thanks to 
government regulations. Organizations are now developing methodologies and tools to assess 
compliance of Information Systems (IS) security. The research outlined in this paper is part of a 
longitudinal action research study which aims to help inform and improve security within Whole of 
Government (WoG). This paper examines the different effects of organisational size on IS security 
compliance within government organisations and how the adoption of security controls differed 
across small, medium and large government agencies. This paper identifies differences across 
government agencies rather than assuming that IS security compliance within e-government would 
be the same for different sized agencies. The approach utilised within this study may be extended to 
assess compliance with regulations in small, medium and large, multi-unit organizations in other 
sectors as well as government. 
 
Keywords: Compliance, Information System, Security, Risk, e-Business, e-Government 
 
Introduction 
The transformation from traditional government practices to e-Government14 may prove to be one 
of the most important policy decisions in the history of government.  Research and popular press 
indicate that one of the major concerns of business and consumers is the security of on-line 
communications and financial transactions (eCommStrategies, 2000). Progress of e-Government 
will continue to grow if business and government are convinced that transactions are secure and 
reliable (The Audit Office of New South Wales, 2002). 
An increasingly important aspect of government business is the development of e-Commerce 
systems commonly known as e-Government (Carter & Balanger, 2004). e-Government research is 
still immature as are e-Government business models and the benefits, which have not been fully 
realised.  The current published literature focuses mainly on research areas such as business re-
development of e-Government (driving government reform); connecting business to government 
connecting customers to government services; e-procurement or the payment of bills on-line; 
simplifying the processes of conducting business by on-line services; and grouping e-government 
into a one approach for all (Fingar, 1998). Current literature, however does not address a number 
of the main e-Government concerns surrounding risk and security issues. 
The purpose of e-Government security systems is to safeguard the information being transmitted 
within the framework of electronic service delivery (Pivk, 2000).  A New South Wales audit report 
                                                 
14 “The use of information and communications technologies, and particularly the Internet, as a tool to achieve 
better government” (OECD, 2003 p1) 
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(2002, p.36) however stated, “There appears to be limited knowledge at line agency level of the 
risks associated with increased use of the Internet and related technologies, and how best to 
manage them”. This paper outlines a research study which was an initiative of New South Wales 
Government to assist government agencies to improve the overall understanding of government’s 
IS risks and security compliance. As the volume of electronic transactions is increasing, the extent 
of threats is also increasing from areas like hacking, virus infections and website defacement. It is 
crucial for government agencies to maintain trust with all participants and ensure associated risks 
are well managed (WA, 2003; Whitman, 2004). Most governments in Australia now adopt a risk 
management approach to security, based on risk identification, risk analysis and mitigation, 
combined with techniques to create awareness, deter, prevent, detect and recover from disasters. 
  
Information Systems Security 
Information Systems Security (ISSec) is the effective implementation of policies to ensure that the 
confidentiality, availability and integrity of information and assets are protected from theft, 
tampering, manipulation or corruption. Heekes (2002), Hof (2002) and WA Government (2003) 
highlight the importance of IS security within e-Government systems.  Electronic information is 
extremely portable and very easy to change.  The administration, business and legal processes 
associated with security and protection of electronic government information have not been fully 
developed (Scott, 2003).  Consequently, government projects are endeavouring to develop policies 
and procedures to improve security (Frank, 2003).  From the public’s perspective, government is 
seen as one entity; hence a security problem within one agency may be viewed as a failure of the 
government as an entity.   
IS Security (ISS) has previously concentrated on protecting the confidentiality of documents stored 
electronically.  In terms of the public perception of government organisations, security means the 
protection of records and data that are held for the purpose of administering the acts and policies of 
government agencies (Martin, 2005). This applies equally to paper documents as well as the data 
held in computer databases (Kiel, 2003).  The rapid growth in the volume of information stored 
electronically and the uptake of e-Commerce within government has heightened the need for 
increased security to protect the privacy of this information and prevent fraudulent activities 
(Spinellis, 1999). 
The process of improving security within the Whole of Government (WoG) therefore is viewed as 
essential. It is clear that where the public is involved in transacting electronically with government, 
public confidence is essential to ensure the future viability of these services. Cost savings are a 
major driving factor towards an increased use of electronic services, especially as the government 
is moving towards greater efficiency within the public service. The Office of Information and 
Communication Technology (OICT, 2004) in NSW outlines several benefit categories related to 
investment in information technology, as they relate to community expectations for: 
o improved service; 
o wider range of services; 
o tailored services; 
o geographic access to services; 
The Tenth Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems (PACIS 2006) 
 
 660  
o new legislation or regulations introduced; 
o equity of access policies; 
o reduced real operating budget; 
o competition for resources; 
o demand growing faster than resources; and 
o changes in technology price/performance. 
 
These driving factors can only be achieved where public confidence, and hence appropriate 
security, is established with the relevant information systems within the public service. These 
factors are a direct reference to the Critical Success Factors (CSF) of 
AS/NZS17799.2001/Amendent:1-2004, and underpin the successful implementation of the 
standard and the community expectations it reflects. 
 
Information Systems Security Standard 
A number of frameworks AS/NZS4444:1999 have been developed and tested since the 1970s to 
quantify and manage the issue of information system security (Mitrou, et al, 2005). Australia’s 
standard for Information Security Management, AS/NZS17799.1:2001 (Information technology - 
Code of practice for information security management), provides a framework and set of 
recommendations in a risk management context. Based on the British BS7799 Standard, 
AS/NZS17799.1:2001 has been revised for application to e-Commerce, and re-branded from its 
previous incarnation as AS/NZS4444.1:1999 Part 1 and AS/NZS4444.2:2000 Part 2. The 
Australian Standard AS/NZS17799.1:2001 and AS/NZS7799.2:2000 (revised as 
AS/NZS17799.2:2003)  was selected as the framework for the project as it allowed agencies to be 
accredited to a nationally accepted and reliable approach methodology which also linked to the 
Australian Standard  for risk management AS4360:1999 (revised in 2004). A more detailed 
chronology of the dates of introduction for IS Security standards in shown in figure 1 below. 
The focus of AS/NZS17799.1:2001 is to protect security of information by providing a set of 
controls and best practices for situations that are applicable for e-Commerce. With the increasing 
volume of business being conducted between organisations over electronic networks, it is essential 
that a trusted relationship be established between the stakeholders trading together. One such 
scheme is for all parties to agree on an appropriate standard (AS/NZS17799.1:2001), adopt its 
principles, and move to certification. Accreditation and certification is possible for 7799 and 
recognised internationally (under ISO 17799) (Mitrou, et al, 2005), however, there are very few 
organisations that can offer this service and currently only two (2) organisations are offering the 
service of accrediting organisations and agencies in Australia. The adoption of standards is 
becoming increasingly important to establish benchmarks by which organisations and clients, 
conducting business on-line, can be assured. An additional benefit of this standard is its regular (6 
monthly) review to ensure that certification to the standard is maintained, thus providing extra rigor 
to security compliance. 
Risk management is also an integral part of AS/NZS17799.1:2001 security certification. 
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AS/NZS17799.1:2001 recommends a series of actions to define the scope/functions of the business 
project, and subsequently attempts to define the security risks associated within the scope of the 
project. Risks are then analysed, ordered and controls are proposed and actioned. To define the 
scope of the AS/NZS779.1:2001 accreditation project, the standard is broken into ten major control 
categories for information security, which are shown in Table 3.4. Within the framework of the ten 
major categories in the security standard, AS/NZS17799.1:2001 there are 127 security controls. 
These controls enable agencies to identify and develop safeguards to protect their information 
resources. Recently the standard AS/NZS17799.1:2001 has been superseded by an International 
Standard ISO/IEC27001:2005. 
 
 
Figure 1: Chronology of IS Security Standards 
Little is written on the risks, risk management and the level of security required to provide 
effective security for e-Government.  Even less is written about recognising the differences 
between government agency categories where agencies are very diverse in size, function and 
funding. The vast majority of literature groups all agencies into one category type for research 
treatment (Cushing, 2005). 
 
Agency Categories 
While the majority of literature groups agencies in one category governments themselves group 
agencies into many different categories for varying reasons. Firstly governments can categorise 
agencies into similar functions or portfolios (eg, health, justice, natural resources etc). Secondly 
agencies can be categorised by funding source either from government directly, a government 
trading organisation or a state owned corporation. For financial reasons (such as payroll), however, 
agencies are commonly grouped by size with full-time employee numbers (FTE) as the defining 
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criterion. Grouping by FTE is also used by other Australian governments, namely the Western 
Australian (WA, 2004) government, Australian the Federal government (ABS, 2005) the New 
Zealand government (New Zealand, 2004) and other international governments.  
Another complication is that some small agencies host their IT systems with a central government 
agency bureau. This structure allows the creation of clusters groups and streamlines their IT 
operations. These clusters can be based either on shared arrangements by business type or portfolio 
affinity. This clustering reduces the time or resources expended on improving security for 
individual agencies. These clusters would create a bias towards the large agencies in terms of the 
management of shared services., because of there individual significance to the government  
 
Study Motivation 
Although the state government takes the responsibility for information security, it is left to the 
government agency level to manage and develop strategies and polices to protect their own 
information. As individual agencies are the custodians of this information, they are in the best 
position to assess its value, and develop the appropriate security measures to protect and preserve it 
from threats (internal/external) and other risks. 
Since individual agencies are responsible for their information this research seeks to determine an 
overall “rich picture” of the current status of IS security within these agencies. This philosophy is 
aligned to a ‘whole-of-public sector’ framework developed in 1977 (the Information Management 
& Technology Blueprint). This approach is necessary due to the increased connectivity between 
external agencies, businesses and individuals.  Information transfers are becoming seamless and 
agencies need to review their security policies and practices to incorporate these connections (such 
as telecommunications, banking and many other services) and to review the inherent risks. In order 
to manage security effectively across government and other organisations, a benchmark needs to 
be established. National and International standards provide the level of consistency required to 
become a yardstick or measure as a consistent benchmark to security. 
The NSW Government adopted the AS/NZS17799.1:2001 (Information technology - Code of 
practice for information security management) standard as the minimum level of IS security for 
agencies to achieve. Agencies were required to achieve compliance to this standard within three 
years starting in December 2001 to ensure a consistent approach to information security. 
The focus of this study was to determine the factors or groups of factors that would assist agencies 
and organisations of different sizes improve the overall level of IS security based on 
AS/NZS17799.1:2001 (Information security management - Specification for information security 
management systems). The security control relating to this area of results and the Australian 
Standard are technological, physical, policy and personnel etc (Wood, 2001). These controls are 
the essence of an effective security framework. This framework has been validated in the 
Government of New South Wales (one of the six largest economies in the in Australia-Pacific 
region) in Australia. This research may also be useful in developing a methodology for the 
assessment of compliance in all organisational sectors and settings. 
 
Research Methods 
This study concentrates on agency size as the method of agency categorisation. Categorising 
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Grouping agencies this way aligns them with other findings within the government domain. 
This study adopts the small-medium-large grouping of government agencies based on full–time 
equivalent (FTE) staff numbers to analyse government responses to the survey. Although several 
category classifications may be applied, categorisation by government agency size in terms of FTE 
appears to be an accepted and established measure used already across NSW government. These 
categories are defined in Table 1 following: 
 
Category Size Count15 
Large  > 1000 FTE. ~ 11 
Medium   350 – 1000 FTE; and ~ 19 
Small  < 350 FTE16;  ~78 
Table 1 – Agencies Categories  
The Australian Standard AS/NZS17799.1:2001 (Information technology - Code of practice for 
information security management) contains ten major sections (see Table 2) of which nine deal 
with security issues and one with Business Continuity Planning.  
Since agencies are required to achieve certification to the standard, the online survey questions 
developed for this study were grouped around the Security and Business Continuity Planning areas 
of the standard. 
 
Survey Instrument 
An on-line survey (containing 85+ questions based on the Australian Standard 
AS/NZS17799.1:2001) was developed to measured agencies status using Likert-scale; yes/no radio 
button and short answer and comments. An analysis of the survey results was undertaken to 
determine the status of agencies in terms of security readiness and summarised to provide an 
overall measure. The survey was conducted between November 2001 and December 2004. Seven 
survey cycles were conducted across approximately 120 NSW government agencies. The number 
of survey questions increased during the study in three phases (also shown in table 2). 
 
Action Research Approach 
The survey administration and development was part of a three-phase longitudinal research design 
that involved an initial exploratory strategy and an iterative development cycle of the survey which 
formed the basis of an action research study. An action research approach was used as a method to 
                                                 
15 The count of agency numbers in categories varies due to agency splits and mergers dictated by central government 
discussions. 
16 Full Time Equivalent staff – (FTE) 
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directly intervene in the longitudinal survey cycles (Farbey et al., 1999). Action research is 
concerned with diagnosing “a problem in a specific context and attempting to solve it in that 
content” (Cohen & Manion, 1989 p2; Altrichter, 1990). Action research can also be described as a 
“cyclic or spiral process, which alternates between action and critical reflection“ (Dick, 2002 p4). 
The flexible nature of action research is achieved by its cyclic process (see figure 2), allowed the 
iterations of the survey to develop a greater understanding of IS Security across the agency survey 
participants. These participants were the agencies nominated IS Security Manager. 
 
Figure 2: Action Research Interacting Spiral 
Survey Key AS/NZS17799.1:2001 Control Categories for Information 
Security 
S1 S2 S3 
Security Policies ? ? ? 
Security Organisation ? ? ? 
Asset Classification & Control   ? 
Personnel Security  ? ? 
Physical / Environmental Security   ? 
Computer & Network Mgt.   ? 
Systems Development & Maintenance   ? ? 
System Access Control  ? ? 
Business Continuity Planning   ? 
IS Policy Compliance   ? 
 
 Survey Cycle 1
Evaluate 
Analyse 
Survey 
Plan 
Evaluate
Analyse
Survey 
Evaluate
Analyse 
Survey 
Plan 
Survey Cycle 2 Survey Cycle 3 - 7
Plan 
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Survey Survey Cycle Questions 
S1 S2 S3 
Survey cycles 1 to 7 contains questions from S1 ?   
Survey cycles 3 to 7 contains questions from S1 and S2 ? ?  
Survey cycles 4 to 7 contained all questions  ? ? ? 
Table 2 – Key Security Issues and Survey Distribution of Questions  
Agencies were directed by the “Head of State” to better manage the risks to their information 
systems and apply the necessary controls and security measures to improve their overall level of 
security and achieve the benchmark of certification to the standard within three years. 
The survey was administered through an action research approach as many of the agencies had 
little or no experience with or awareness of the security standard and the full range of issues that 
could impact on them. The three project stages of a longitudinal seven survey cycle action research 
methodology saw the gradual administration of the survey questions S1, S2, S3 (see also Table 2) 
to an agency’s IS security manager in order to gradually improve their knowledge of IS security 
measures at a manageable rate (considering the other demands the organisation places on their 
duties and time). 
 
Results 
Agencies were asked if they had an IS security framework in place. The 10 categories of 
AS/NZS17799.1:2001 provided a universally recognisable description of a information security 
framework to the survey respondents. The requirements of the standard are an “already accepted 
part of the IT Security landscape and will likely be so for the foreseeable future” (Bindview, 2004 
p4).  
 
The three sub-category of agencies (large, medium and small) are discussed below: 
Large agencies (over 1000 FTE staff) have sufficiently large corporate services structures to 
undertake a security program to achieve accreditation to the standard of AS/NZS17799:2001. They 
generally have enough resources to utilise technology wherever possible to achieve compliance to 
the standard.  
However many large agencies are highly decentralised across long distances and many buildings 
which creates difficultly achieving accreditation across so many facilities. This problem is 
addressed in the risk analysis stage of accreditation where the highest risk business 
functions/processes are mitigated first and lower risk functions are subsequently dealt with.  
For those agencies covering a wide geographic area, the regional or decentralised offices are 
usually similar in terms of organisational structures and duties performed. The process of 
accreditation can be scoped to permit a reduction of the number of regional offices needing 
accreditation for the entire organisation. 
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Medium-sized agencies (between 350 and 1000 FTE staff) have demonstrated the most 
commitment towards accreditation for their security program. In addition, they also participated in 
internal shared corporate services (mainly business process re-engineering) to consolidate services 
into fewer hardware platforms, which in turn allows more streamlined IT/IS systems. 
Small agencies (under 350 FTE staff) present a more varied picture.  Improving IS security across 
these agencies requires significant improvement due to the lack of resources and staff assigned to 
improving security. 
 
 
 
Security Policy 
Combined Small Medium Large 
Survey 
Date 
No Yes % 
Yes 
No Yes % 
Yes 
No Yes % 
Yes 
No Yes % 
Yes 
 
Nov_01 
39 41 
51 
29 28 
49 
5 6 
55 
5 7 
58 
Jan_02 
46 50 
52 
33 32 
49 
5 6 
55 
8 12 
60 
Apr_02 
49 57 
54 
37 34 
48 
5 10 
67 
7 13 
65 
Aug_02 
50 58 
54 
39 33 
48 
5 12 
71 
6 13 
68 
Nov_02 
55 58 
51 
40 34 
46 
8 9 
53 
7 15 
68 
Nov_03 
50 67 
57 
36 42 
54 
9 9 
50 
5 16 
76 
A change of government after the 2003 election caused an agency re-shuffle 
Nov_04 
48 61 
56 
34 44 
56 
9 10 
53 
4 7 
58 
Table 3 – Agencies with or without a Security Policy  
Table 3 highlights the percentage of agencies with a security policy, across small, medium and 
large categories. 
Table 3 and Figure 3, demonstrate that the number of agencies with a security policy change over 
the period from November 2001 to November 2003 for the small (49% - 54%), medium (55% - 
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50%), large (58% - 76%) and combined groupings (51% - 57%). The November 2004 reflected the 
changes in government resulting from an agency re-shuffle. The recorded decrease in large agency 
security policies was possibly due to ‘new’ managers not being fully aware of their responsibilities 
in terms of the government’s IS security initiative.  
Overall there was an increasing trend in the number of agencies with a security policy and the 
decrease in the number of agencies without a security policy. Part of this improvement may be 
attributable to the action research approach of this study. However, there was scope for 
improvement with 46% of agencies still having no security policy. The remaining agencies without 
a security policy were more likely to have a more reactive approach to security. These agencies 
generally wait for security issues to emerge and then respond to the threat, in contrast to an agency 
having a consistent approach from having an actively documented IS security policy thus being 
pro-active before threats emerge. 
Agencies were then asked if they had a dedicated IS security manager (see Table 4). The role of 
the IS security manager, was defined as having the responsibility for co-ordinating the 
implementation of IS security. 
Figure 3 - Agencies with an IS Security Manager (S-M-L Combined) 
The percentage increase in the number of IS security managers demonstrates a commitment to 
security within the agencies, indicating that management was becoming serious about the IS 
security problem. In terms of agency categories for the small agencies the percentage of IS security 
managers increased over the four years of the survey from 74% to 84%. For medium sized 
agencies the percentage of IS Security managers decreased from 100% to 70% over the survey but 
the number of IS Security managers did increase from 6 to 14 managers. The large agencies 
percentage of IS Security managers remained relatively constant (approximately 70%) however the 
number of IS Security managers increased from 5 managers to 14 over four years. 
 
Security Policy - Combined
39
46
49 50
55
50
48
41
50
57 58 58
67
61
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
no
yes
no 39 46 49 50 55 50 48
yes 41 50 57 58 58 67 61
Sep_01 Jan_02 Apr_02 Aug_02 Nov_02 Nov_03 Nov_04
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A detailed analysis of the on-line survey questionnaire has not been presented in this paper. 
However the results showed variable and significant differences between agency S/M/L categories 
across the seven cycles of the longitudinal survey study.  The full survey results also demonstrated 
the impact of the action research approach to survey administration i.e. it raised awareness 
gradually (as well as giving incremental feedback to agencies while they learned about security 
compliance). Differences in resource allocation (namely IS Security Managers) between agencies 
of different sizes and the impact of security compliance to the standard AS/NZS17799.1:2001 were 
also highlighted.  
In terms of completely complying with the standard only a relative few agencies managed full 
certification within the three-year project; however, the greater majority did make significant 
progress toward this goal and many other agencies subsequently did at well. The agencies that 
achieved full certification were in the category of medium sized agencies (in the range of 300-500 
FTE staff), thus indicating IS staff and management within the agencies had the required 
knowledge, understanding and expertise to identify the need for effective security and begin the 
project immediately.  
 
Do you have an IS Security Manager? 
Survey 
Date Agency Size No Yes 
No of Survey17 
respondents 
% of IS Sec 
Mgrs 
Nov_01 Small 9 26  74 
Nov_01 Medium 0 6  100 
Nov_01 
Large 
2 5  71 
Combined   37 80 46.3% 
Jan_02 Small 13 35  73 
Jan_02 Medium 0 8  100 
Jan_02 Large 6 9  60 
Combined   52 98 53.1% 
Apr_02 Small 14 44  76 
Apr_02 Medium 3 9  75 
Apr_02 Large 6 11  65 
Combined   64 111 57.7% 
Aug_02 Small 14 42  75 
Aug_02 Medium 3 10  77 
Aug_02 Large 4 11  73 
Combined   63 114 55.3% 
Nov_02 Small 15 49  77 
Nov_02 Medium 3 12  80 
                                                 
17 Total number of surveys received those who did not answer this questions were assumed to have no IS Security 
Manager. 
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Nov_02 Large 5 15  75 
Combined   76 114 66.7% 
Nov_03 Small 10 62  86 
Nov_03 Medium 3 14  82 
Nov_03 Large 6 13  68 
Combined   89 118 75.4% 
Nov_04 Small 12 61  84 
Nov_04 Medium 4 14  78 
Nov_04 Large 6 14  70 
Combined   89 112 79.5% 
Table 4 – Agencies with an IS Security Manager  
The small agencies generally had difficulty with their security projects although the percentage of 
agencies with IS Security Managers was high as they were mainly part-time positions however 
50% of them had IS security policies. Conversely, the large agencies generally had too many core 
information systems to attempt to make them security compliant with all their systems. They had 
the lowest number of IS Security Managers at approximately 60% but further analysis suggested 
that they used specialist consultants to develop security policies. This explains why 58% - 76% of 
agencies have security policies, which for some very large agencies was an enormous task. 
Agencies in both these categories (small and large) would have benefited by adopting, a risk 
management approach that would allow them to identify those systems that were crucial to the 
agency and concentrate on making them compliant to the standard AS/NZS17799.1:2001. This 
would provide the greatest security protection to that agency’s most critical system(s).  
Both small and large agencies had this problem because they generally lacked a risk management 
strategy. A well developed business impact analysis would have allowed the available resources to 
be better used and permit the agency to learn the process of becoming certified to the major 
business system (and then subsequently roll out other less crucial systems). 
Large agencies have the benefit of more resources being available for projects, however large 
agencies also have substantial IS/IT system investments. Any changes, updates or upgrades are 
expensive in terms of resources and budget. The organisation culture usually places equal 
importance on all systems whereas a risk management approach would identify systems that are 
more critical thus, creating a list of systems/projects in order of importance to the government 
agency. In addition, the culture within the large organisation dictated that the IS staff should be 
responsible for and manage the issues of achieving accreditation to the standard by themselves. 
This compounded the problem because newer systems are generally more complex (including 
security settings), thus requiring greater effort from IS staff to commission and maintain them. 
In small agencies, the organisational culture had a greater influence on the lack of progress with 
achieving compliance. Small agencies generally have limited resources available in the IS/IT 
branch and additional projects, such as security compliance, must compete for limited resources. 
Mandating improved security across agencies placed an increased workload on the staff. Small 
agencies were already coping with other IS/IT issues of more complex systems, updates, software 
patches, equipment replacement etc, and had limited access to training courses and forums. 
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Conclusions, Limitations and Further Research  
Based on the discussion above, practitioners should conduct a risk analysis of their agency systems 
and determine the agency’s most critical system and thus complete certification firstly for this 
system. Also, a comprehensive business impact analysis would allow senior management to assign 
resources to the certification of the most critical agency systems.  
A strategy for large agencies trying to achieve certification to the security standard and full risk 
analysis of all business systems, must be undertaken to identify an agency’s most vital business 
system. Certification of less critical systems should then be subsequently undertaken. Where large 
agencies have multiple critical systems a business impact analysis would allow management to 
determine the effect each system would have on an agency if it failed. For small agencies that 
usually only have one or two critical systems (one being the finance or human resource system), 
usually these systems are outsourced to security compliant central agencies or processing bureaux 
thus, allowing the larger central agency (or organisation) to incorporate the smaller systems into 
their security certification strategy an this improves IS security for both the central and small 
agencies. 
This study has recognised the differences across agencies rather than assuming that security 
compliance within e-government would be the same for small, medium and large agencies. This 
study highlights the deficiency of having a single viewpoint for an e-government study of this type.  
Further analysis might compare data such as this, across various government portfolios as well as 
across and between different organisation sectors. This study may also be highly relevant to other 
national governments or multi-organisational corporations. 
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